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Executive Summary 
 
It is now 20 years since NAFTA went into effect, bringing Mexico into a new commercial 
agreement with the United States and Canada.  At the time it was argued, and forecast, that the 
agreement would boost Mexico’s growth and development.  
 
This paper compares the performance of the Mexican economy with that of the rest of the region 
over the past 20 years, based on the available economic and social indicators, and with its own past 
economic performance.  Among the results: 
 
 Mexico ranks 18th of 20 Latin American countries in growth of real GDP per person, the 
most basic economic measure of living standards. 
 
 From 1960-1980, Mexican real GDP per person almost doubled, growing by 98.7 percent.  
By comparison, in the past 20 years it has grown by just 18.6 percent.   
 
 Mexico’s per capita GDP growth of just 18.6 percent over the past 20 years is about half of 
the rate of growth achieved by the rest of Latin America. 
 
 If NAFTA had been successful in restoring Mexico’s pre-1980 growth rate – when 
developmentalist economic policies were the norm – Mexico today would be a relatively 
high income country, with income per person significantly higher than that of Portugal or 
Greece.  It is unlikely that immigration reform would be a major political issue in the United 
States, since relatively few Mexicans would seek to cross the border. 
 
 According to Mexican national statistics, Mexico’s poverty rate of 52.3 percent in 2012 is 
almost identical to the poverty rate of 1994.  As a result, there were 14.3 million more 
Mexicans living below the poverty line as of 2012 (the latest data available) than in 1994. 
 
 We can use the poverty statistics of the UN Economic Commission on Latin America 
(ECLAC) to compare Mexico’s poverty rate with the rest of Latin America. These statistics 
are computed differently and show a decline in poverty in Mexico.  However, according to 
these measures, the rest of Latin America saw a drop in poverty that was more than two and 
a half times as much as that of Mexico:   20 percentage points (from 46 to 26 percent) for 
the rest of Latin America, versus 8 percentage points (from 45.1 to 37.1 percent) for Mexico. 
 
 Real (inflation-adjusted) wages for Mexico were almost the same in 2012 as in 1994, up just 
2.3 percent over 18 years, and barely above their level of 1980. 
 
 Unemployment in Mexico is 5.0 percent today, as compared with 2.2 percent in 1994; these 
numbers seriously understate the true lack of jobs, but they show a significant deterioration 
in the labor market during the NAFTA years. 
 
 NAFTA also had a severe impact on agricultural employment, as U.S. subsidized corn and 
other products wiped out family farmers in Mexico.  From 1991-2007, there were 4.9 million 
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Mexican family farmers displaced; while seasonal labor in agro-export industries increased by 
about 3 million.  This meant a net loss of 1.9 million jobs. 
 
 The very poor performance of the Mexican economy contributed to a surge in emigration to 
the United States. From 1994-2000, the annual number of Mexicans emigrating to the 
United States soared by 79 percent.  The number of Mexican-born residents living in the 
United States more than doubled from 4.5 million in 1990 to 9.4 million in 2000, and peaked 
at 12.6 million in 2009. 
 
NAFTA was just one variable among others that could account for Mexico’s poor economic 
performance over the past 20 years.  However, it appears to be related to other economic policy 
choices that have negatively affected the Mexican economy during this period. The IMF notes that 
“Mexico competes directly with China in the U.S. market, where China accounts for 23 percent of 
U.S. imports and Mexico accounts for 12 percent.”  This is a very tough competition for Mexico for 
a number of reasons. First, Mexico was and remains a higher-wage country than China.  Second, 
China has maintained a commitment to a competitive exchange rate, in effect fixing this exchange 
rate against the dollar or (since 2005) a basket of currencies. The Mexican central bank by contrast 
has, as the IMF notes, “a firm commitment to exchange rate flexibility.”  In other words, the 
Mexican Central Bank will raise or lower interest rates as necessary to reach its target inflation rate (3 
percent), and let the exchange rate go where it may. This means that Mexico’s exchange rate is 
unlikely to be competitive with China’s, which further worsens its cost disadvantage.  The Mexican 
Central Bank’s form of rigid inflation targeting also adds a large element of unpredictability to the 
exchange rate, which has a negative impact on foreign direct investment; foreign investors will find it 
difficult to know how much their assets or output will be worth internationally in the future. 
 
China has other advantages that make it a formidable competitor for Mexico in the U.S. market: the 
Chinese government owns most of the banking system in China, and can therefore ensure that its 
most important exporting firms have sufficient access to credit. In Mexico, by contrast, 70 percent 
of the banking system is not only private but foreign-owned.  The Chinese government also has an 
active industrial policy that enables it to help its exporting firms in various ways, and spends vastly 
more on research and development – both in absolute terms and as a percentage of its economy. 
 
NAFTA also increasingly tied Mexico to the U.S. economy, at a time when the U.S. economy was 
becoming dependent on growth driven by asset bubbles.  As a result, Mexico suffered a recession 
when the stock market bubble burst in 2000-2002, and was one the hardest hit countries in the 
region during the U.S. Great Recession, with a drop of 6.7 percent of GDP.  The Mexican economy 
was even harder hit by the peso crisis in 1994-95, losing 9.5 percent of GDP during the downturn; 
the crisis was caused by the U.S. Federal Reserve raising interest rates in 1994.  
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The vulnerability to developments in U.S. financial markets continues: In May of 2013, after the U.S. 
Federal Reserve announced a future “tapering” of its quantitative easing program (QE3), there were 
fears of a repeat of the 1994 peso crisis, and gross foreign portfolio inflows came to a sudden stop. 
The Mexican economy took a hit, with projected growth at 1.22 percent for the year. This was 
mostly because, as the IMF noted, “Mexico’s deep and liquid foreign exchange and domestic equity 
and sovereign bond markets can serve as an early port of call for global investors in episodes of 
financial turbulence and hence are susceptible to risks of contagion.”  This vulnerability is also a 
result of the policies that NAFTA was designed to facilitate. 
 
As was well known at the time of NAFTA’s passage, the main purpose of NAFTA was to lock in a 
set of economic policies, some of which were already well under way in the decade prior, including 
the liberalization of manufacturing, foreign investment and ownership, and other changes.1  The idea 
was that the continuation and expansion of these policies would allow Mexico to achieve efficiencies 
and economic progress that was not possible under the developmentalist, protectionist economic 
model that had prevailed in the decades before 1980. While some of the policy changes were 
undoubtedly necessary and/or positive, the end result has been decades of economic failure by 
almost any economic or social indicator. This is true whether we compare Mexico to its 
developmentalist past, or even if the comparison is to the rest of Latin America since NAFTA. After 
20 years, these results should provoke more public discussion as to what went wrong.  
 
 
  
                                                 
1  See Tornell and Esquivel (1997). 
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Income and Growth 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect in January of 1994, bringing 
Mexico into a new commercial agreement with the United States and Canada.  At the time it was 
argued, and forecast,2 that the agreement would boost Mexico’s growth and development. After 10 
years of the agreement, the World Bank published a paper with an econometric analysis purporting 
to show that NAFTA had increased Mexico’s growth rate, at least relative to that of the United 
States.3  However, it turned out that this result was dependent on a data error.4 
 
It is difficult to demonstrate unequivocally whether Mexico would have done worse in the absence 
of NAFTA, because many elements of the counter-factual are unknowable.  However, one can 
compare the performance of the Mexican economy with that of the rest of the region over the past 
20 years on the available economic and social indicators, and with its own past economic 
performance. Such a comparison follows, along with some analysis of possible explanations for 
Mexico’s poor performance. 
 
Figure 1 shows the growth of income per capita in Mexico. This is the most basic measure of 
economic progress. As can be seen, per capita GDP has grown by just 19.0 percent, cumulatively, 
from 1994 through 2013. This is an average annual growth rate of just 0.9 percent, which is quite 
low for a developing country.   
 
FIGURE 1 
Mexico: Real GDP Per Capita  
 
Source: IMF (2013). 
                                                 
2    See Stanford (2003). 
3  Lederman, Maloney, and Serven (2004). 
4  See Weisbrot, Rosnick, and Baker (2004). The authors of the study, and the World Bank, never acknowledged the error, but did 
not address it either in their correspondence on the subject.  For a complete timeline with documents, including revisions to the 
WB paper and correspondence, see http://www.cepr.net/index.php/holding-the-world-bank-accountable-for-its-research-the-
case-of-nafta/ .  
88.1 
104.9 
101.5 
112.9 
105.6 
113.2 
 -
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
C
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
2
0
0
8
 P
e
s
o
s
, 
T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
 
 Did NAFTA Help Mexico?: An Assessment After 20 Years  5 
 
Table 1 shows Mexico’s annual per capita GDP growth rate compared to the rest of Latin America 
(South America and Central America). Mexico’s growth ranks 18th of 20 countries. From these 
numbers, and in the absence of any natural disaster or war in Mexico during the past 20 years that 
could account for such poor economic performance, it would be difficult to argue that Mexico 
would have done even worse in the absence of NAFTA. 
 
TABLE 1 
Latin America: Average Annual Growth Per 
Capita 1994-2013 
1 Panama 4.4% 
2 Chile 3.4% 
3 Peru 3.4% 
4 Guyana 3.0% 
5 Costa Rica 2.5% 
6 Uruguay 2.5% 
7 Argentina 2.5% 
8 Suriname 2.4% 
9 Colombia 2.1% 
10 Nicaragua 2.0% 
11 El Salvador 1.9% 
12 Ecuador 1.9% 
13 Brazil 1.8% 
14 Bolivia 1.7% 
15 Honduras 1.6% 
16 Belize 1.5% 
17 Paraguay 1.0% 
18 Mexico 0.9% 
19 Venezuela 0.8% 
20 Guatemala 0.6% 
Source: IMF (2013a), Feenstra, Inklaar and 
Timmer (2013), authors' calculations. 
 
It is worth comparing Mexico’s growth rate since NAFTA to that of its past, again in the context of 
the rest of the region.  This can be seen in Figure 2A. From 1960-1980, Mexico almost doubled its 
income per person, a growth rate which was comparable to Latin America as a whole. If this growth 
had continued, Mexico would be a high-income country today. However, both Mexico and the 
region suffered a sharp slowdown in the growth of income per capita over the following 20 years, 
1980-2000, a period that coincided with first a badly handled debt crisis in the early 1980s and then a 
number of neoliberal policy changes.  Regional growth of GDP per capita dropped from 91.5 
percent for the prior two decades, to just 7.7 percent for 1980-2000, or just 0.4 percent annually. 
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FIGURE 2A 
Mexico and Latin America: Average Annual Real Per-Capita GDP Growth, 1960-2013 
 
  
 
FIGURE 2B 
Mexico and Latin America: Average Annual Real Per-Capita GDP Growth, 1994-2013 
 
Source: IMF (2013a).  See methodology from in Weisbrot and Ray (2011). 
Note: Latin America region includes Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
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It is also worth examining where Mexico would be today if its income per person had continued to 
grow at the rate that it did over the two decades prior to 1980.  This is shown in Figure 3.  This 
result was not impossible, as can be seen by the comparison with South Korea, which grew at a 
similar rate as did Mexico (although from a lower starting point) from 1960-1980, and did not suffer 
from Mexico’s growth collapse thereafter.  Mexico in 2013 would have an income per person of 
more than $41,000, in international purchasing power parity dollars,5 which would make its living 
standards about the same as the Netherlands today.  It might be argued that Mexico’s growth rate 
during this period was not sustainable; for comparison, Figure 3 includes the actual trajectory of 
South Korea, which is today a high-income country; its per capita GDP is more than $33,000 
(between the level of Spain and France, respectively).   
 
FIGURE 3 
Mexico and South Korea: Real GDP Per Capita, 1960-2013 
 
Source: IMF (2013a). 
 
NAFTA was an integral part of a “reform” process that began with major trade liberalization 
reforms in the 1980s, and was designed to expand upon and lock in a set of policies that would set 
                                                 
5  A purchasing power parity (PPP) estimate of per capita GDP attempts to adjust for the difference in prices between different 
countries so that the same PPP dollar amount represents the same purchasing power in the countries compared. 
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the economy on an irreversible path that was very different from that defined by the 
developmentalist state and protectionist policies of the pre-1980 period.6  However, even if we look 
at just the 20 years since NAFTA, and ask what Mexico would look like today if NAFTA had 
restored Mexico’s 1960-1980 growth rate – after more than a decade of failure --- it would still be a 
reasonably high-income country.  Per capita GDP would be about $26,000 today, significantly more 
than that of Portugal or Greece. 
 
Most of the rest of Latin America had a rebound in the 21st century, with average annual per capita 
GDP growth of 2.0 percent for 2000-2013.  But Mexico did not share in that rebound, growing only 
0.6 percent annually per capita for those years. Figure 2B shows Mexico’s per capita GDP growth 
for the 20 years since NAFTA: it was about half of that for the region as a whole.  
 
As would be expected during such a period of very little economic growth, Mexico did not make 
progress in reducing poverty.  Figure 4 shows Mexico’s national poverty rate. In 2012 it was 52.3 
percent, almost identical to the 52.4 percent rate in 1994. As a result, there were 14.3 million more 
Mexicans living below the poverty line as of 2012 (the latest data available) than in 1994. Measures 
of more extreme poverty – “unable to afford health care, education and food” and “unable to afford 
food” also improved very little since 1994. 
 
FIGURE 4 
Mexico: Poverty Levels Based on Consumption Baskets (CONEVAL estimate) 
 
Source: CONEVAL (2014). 
 
                                                 
6  See e.g. Tornell and Esquivel (1995) for a review of this history. 
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We can also compare what happened to poverty in Mexico with the region as a whole.  This can be 
seen in Figure 5.  For the region as a whole, there was no progress on the poverty rate for more 
than two decades, from 1980 to 2002. As seen in Figure 4, the poverty rate for the region then fell 
from 43.9 percent in 2002 to 27.9 percent in 2013.  
 
FIGURE 5 
Latin America: Poverty and Extreme Poverty (ECLAC estimate) 
 
Source: ECLAC (2014). 
 
However, these poverty rates, from the U.N. Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLAC), 
are computed from national surveys somewhat differently than those of Mexico’s national poverty 
statistics. For a comparison between Mexico and the rest of the region, it therefore makes sense to 
compare ECLAC’s computation of the poverty rate for Mexico with its computation for the rest of 
the region (without Mexico).  This is shown in Figure 6. By ECLAC’s measure, Mexico’s poverty 
rate falls from 45.1 percent in 1994 to 37.1 percent (8 percentage points) in 2012.  But in the rest of 
the region, excluding Mexico, it falls two and a half times as much, from 46 percent to 26 percent 
(20 percentage points).  
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FIGURE 6 
Mexico and Latin America: Poverty, 1994 and 2012 (ECLAC estimate) 
 
Source: ECLAC (2014b).  
 
Figure 7 shows the path of real wages in Mexico from 1994-2012.7 There is a fall in real wages of 
21.2 percent from 1994-1996, associated with the peso crisis and recession.  Wages do not recover 
to their pre-crisis (1994) level until 2005, 11 years later.  By 2012, they are only 2.3 percent above the 
1994 level, and barely above their level of 1980.  
 
The minimum wage, adjusted for inflation, fared even worse.  From 1994 to 2012, it fell by 26.3 
percent.8 
 
FIGURE 7 
Mexico: Real Average Wages 
 
Source: ECLAC (2014b). 
                                                 
7  These are wages of formal sector workers contributing to the Mexican Social Security Institute (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro 
Social). 
8  ECLAC (2014c). 
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Figure 8 shows Mexico’s unemployment and underemployment rate. (Unemployment is shown 
since 1994; data on underemployment are only available since 2005.) Although the unemployment 
rate jumped during the peso crisis and then fell steadily until 2000, there seems to be a secular drift 
upward over the past 13 years. Unemployment is currently at 5.0 percent, compared to a low of 2.2 
percent in 2000. These numbers are small in absolute terms, because the official unemployment rate 
does not capture the full extent of unemployment in Mexico.  In order to be counted as 
unemployed, a worker has to have not worked even one hour in paid activity during the reference 
period in which the survey was taken; and he or she must have been actively looking for work. But 
there are many people who would not be counted as unemployed in this data, who are not very 
much employed.  
 
FIGURE 8 
Mexico: Unemployment and Underemployment, Seasonally Adjusted 
 
Source: INEGI (2014a), CESOP (2005). 
 
This is partly because Mexico has very little social safety net and no unemployment insurance 
outside of the Federal District. For this reason, heads of households especially will generally engage 
in some kind of economic activity in order to survive.9  There is a very high level of informal labor; 
more than half of all workers are employed in units of less than five employees. For these and other 
reasons, movements in the official rate should be seen as an indicator of the proportionate 
deterioration (and recovery) of the labor market, and not as a measure of the actual level of 
unemployment.  
 
                                                 
9  See Salas (2013) for more data and analysis of unemployment in Mexico. 
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A somewhat better measure of the state of the labor market is underemployment, also shown in 
Figure 8, going back to 2005. This includes workers who have a demonstrated need and ability to 
work more hours, but were not able to do so due to labor market conditions. This was 8.4 percent 
for 2013, up from an annual average of 7.2 percent for the pre-crisis years 2005-2007. 
 
At first glance, Mexico appears to have made moderate progress on measures of inequality in the 
post-NAFTA period. Figure 9 shows the Gini coefficient for household income for the years 1994-
2012. It shows a decline from 0.54 to 0.49.  
 
FIGURE 9 
Mexico: Gini Coefficient 
 
Source: ECLAC (2014d). 
 
Although it is not that large, the decline in inequality is something of a mystery, during a period in 
which real wages stagnated, unemployment and underemployment worsened, income growth was 
very slow, and the national poverty rate was the same in 2012 as in 1994.  One possible explanation 
may be in the data. In general, in the kind of survey data on which these statistics are based, a large 
part of the income of the wealthiest households is not reported. For example, in the United States 
from 1976-2006, the Gini coefficient using income tax data and including capital gains showed an 
increase of 10.8 points, more than twice increase in the standard Gini coefficient using survey (CPS) 
data.10  And in Mexico, enormous fortunes were accumulated during the past 20 years.  For example, 
Mexico’s richest billionaire, Carlos Slim Helu, reportedly increased his net worth by $66.4 billion 
(from $6.6 billion in 1994 to $73 billion today). The combined net worth of 15 Mexican billionaires 
in Forbes list is currently $150 billion.  It is possible that the incomes of these billionaires and others 
in the top one percent, depending on how much was not reported in the household surveys, could 
erase or reverse the above decline in the Gini coefficient.   
                                                 
10   See Atkinson, Picketty, and Saez (2011) 
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Efforts to decompose the sources of the decline in inequality shown in the Gini coefficient from 
household survey data in Mexico from 1996 to 2006 have indicated that most of it can be attributed 
to labor income per person.11   In other words there was a reduction in the inequality within labor 
income.  However, with overall real wages stagnant from 1994 to 2012, the living standards of the 
vast majority of workers cannot have increased very much. 
 
In any case, even if the redistribution had taken place as it appears in the Gini data, it was not 
enough to reduce the national poverty rate; nor was the economic growth of the past 20 years 
sufficient to reduce unemployment or underemployment.   
 
Agriculture and Employment 
 
NAFTA removed tariffs (but not subsidies) on agricultural goods, with a transition period in which 
there was a steadily increasing import quota for certain commodities. The transition period was 
longest for corn, the most important crop for Mexican producers, only ending in 2008.  Not 
surprisingly, U.S. production, which is not only subsidized but had higher average productivity levels 
than that of Mexico, displaced millions of Mexican farmers. Table 2 shows agricultural employment 
in Mexico in 1991 and 2007, according to census data. 
 
TABLE 2 
Mexico: Employment in Agricultural and Forestry from Agrarian Census 1991, 2007 
    1991 2007 Percent Change 
Family* 8,370,879 3,510,394 -58% 
Remunerated Total 2,305,432 5,139,793 123% 
    - Permanent (more  than 6 months) 427,337 420,989 -1% 
    - Seasonal (less than 6 months) 1,878,095 4,718,804 151% 
Total 10,676,311 8,650,187 -19% 
Source: Adapted from Table 1 in Scott (2010) p.76.  
* Family and other workers who are not paid in cash are sometimes listed as "non-remunerated." 
 
As can be seen, there was a 19 percent drop in agricultural employment, or about 2 million jobs.  
The loss was in family labor employed in the family farm sector.  Seasonal (less than 6 months 
employment gained about 3 million jobs, but it was not nearly enough to compensate for the 4.9 
million jobs lost in the family farm sector.  
                                                 
11  See Esquivel, Lustig and Scott (2010) for analysis and discussion of the sources of the decrease in inequality from 1996-2006.  
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Proponents of NAFTA of course knew that family farms in Mexico would not be able to compete 
with subsidized U.S. production but argued that displaced workers would shift to higher 
productivity agriculture (mainly vegetables and fruits for export), as well as industrial jobs.  Although 
vegetable and fruit production did expand considerably (from 17.3 million tons in 1994 to 28.2 
million in 2012), and presumably accounted for many of the 3 million seasonal jobs created, it was 
clearly not enough in terms of employment.  
 
From 1994-2000, the annual number of Mexicans emigrating to the United States soared by 79 
percent.  This can be seen in Table 3, with the annual flow of migrants rising from 430,000 in 1994 
to 770,000 in 2000.  After 2000, the flow of migrants slowed, with a number of contributing factors:  
increased border security after the 9/11 attacks; the U.S. recession of 2001 and the prolonged 
weakness in job creation in the years that followed; and the increased costs and danger of crossing 
the border.12 
 
                                                 
12  See Pasell et al (2012). 
TABLE 3  TABLE 4 
Annual Immigration from Mexico to U.S.: 1991-2010  Mexican-Born Population in the U.S., 1980-2011 
(in thousands)  (in thousands) 
2010 140  2011 11,987 
2009 150  2010 12,323 
2008 250  2009 12,565 
2007 280  2008 12,551 
2006 390  2007 12,558 
2005 550  2006 12,043 
2004 670  2005 11,653 
2003 570  2004 11,356 
2002 580  2003 10,661 
2001 580  2002 10,426 
2000 770  2001 9,734 
1999 700  2000 9,444 
1998 600  1990 4,500 
1997 470  1980 2,199 
1996 490  Source: Adapted from Passel, Cohn and González-
Barrera (2012). 1995 570  
1994 430    
1993 370    
1992 400    
1991 370  
 Source: Passel, Cohn and González-Barrera (2012). 
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The increase in emigration can also be seen in Table 4, which shows the number of Mexican-born 
residents living in the United States.  This more than doubled from 4.5 million in 1990 to 9.4 million 
in 2000, and peaked at 12.6 million in 2009. 
 
It was noted previously that if the Mexican economy had continued growing at the rate of 1960-
1980, Mexico would be a high-income country today; and that it would also have become a 
reasonably high-income country if its pre-1980 growth rate had been restored after NAFTA. There 
would still be a significant income and wage differential between Mexico and the United States, but 
the incentive to emigrate to the United States would have been drastically reduced along the way. It 
is questionable whether immigration reform would have become a political issue in the United States 
if not for the poor performance of the Mexican economy in the NAFTA years.  
 
 
Economic Policy and Mexican Integration with 
the United States Economy 
 
As noted above, NAFTA was just one variable among others that could account for Mexico’s poor 
economic performance over the past 20 years.  However, it appears to be related to other economic 
policy choices that have negatively affected the Mexican economy during this period. 
 
The IMF notes that “Mexico competes directly with China in the U.S. market, where China accounts 
for 23 percent of U.S. imports and Mexico accounts for 12 percent.”13  This is a very tough 
competition for Mexico for a number of reasons. First, Mexico is a higher-wage country than China, 
in addition to China’s exchange rate advantage. In 1996, labor compensation costs in Mexico, in U.S. 
dollars, were $3.05 per hour, and rose to $5.59 by 2002. 14 For China in 2002, hourly compensation 
costs in U.S. dollars were $0.73 per hour.15  Although these data are not exactly comparable because 
of differences in their construction, they indicate a huge gap in dollar terms – which is what matters 
for export or import-competing industries.  By 2009, the gap was still very large: $1.74 for China 
versus $6.36 for Mexico.16 So it is difficult to compete on the basis of wages.  Second, China has 
maintained a commitment to a competitive exchange rate, in effect fixing this exchange rate against 
the dollar or (since 2005) a basket of currencies. The Mexican central bank by contrast has, as the 
IMF notes, “a firm commitment to exchange rate flexibility.”17  In other words, the Mexican Central 
Bank will raise or lower interest rates as necessary to reach its target inflation rate (3 percent), and let 
                                                 
13  IMF (2013). 
14  BLS (2013). 
15  Ibid. 
16  Again, the numbers are not exactly comparable but still indicate a large gap in labor costs.   See BLS (2013). 
17  IMF (2013) 
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the exchange rate go where it may. This means that Mexico’s exchange rate is unlikely to be 
competitive with China’s, which further worsens its cost disadvantage.  The Mexican Central Bank’s 
form of rigid inflation targeting also adds a large element of unpredictability to the exchange rate, 
which has a negative impact on foreign direct investment; foreign investors will find it difficult to 
know how much their assets or output will be worth internationally in the future.   
 
China has other advantages that make it a formidable competitor for Mexico in the U.S. market: the 
Chinese government owns most of the banking system in China, and can therefore ensure that its 
most important exporting firms have sufficient access to credit. In Mexico, by contrast, 70 percent 
of the banking system is not only private but foreign-owned.18  The Chinese government also has an 
active industrial policy that enables it to help its exporting firms in various ways.19  China also spends 
1.84 percent of its (many times larger) GDP on research and development, as compared to Mexico’s 
0.46 percent.20 
 
For all of these reasons, it is an uphill battle for Mexico to compete with China in the U.S. market. 
Although Mexico has done better than other countries in the U.S. market in terms of this 
competition since China joined the World Trade Organization and achieved “permanent normal 
trade relations” with the U.S. in 2001,21 its share of U.S. imports is still only about half that of 
China’s (see Figure 10). 
 
FIGURE 10 
United States: Nonpetroleum Imports from Mexico and China 
 
Source: BLS (no date, a), BLS (no date, b), Pemex (various years). 
* 2012 data preliminary pending annual report from Pemex 
 
                                                 
18  Ibid. 
19  See Weisbrot and Ray (2011). 
20  WB (2014). 
21  Blecker and Esquivel (2013).  
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NAFTA also increasingly tied Mexico to the U.S. economy. Figure 11 shows how the Mexican 
economy has moved with the U.S. economy over the past 20 years. Much of this synchronization is 
because 71 percent of Mexico’s exports now go to the United States. Unfortunately, 1994 was a 
particularly bad time for Mexico to hitch its wagon to the United States. First came the peso crisis, 
which was brought on by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s increases in U.S. short-term (policy) rates 
beginning in 1994.  Mexico lost 9.5 percent of GDP in two quarters during the resulting crisis and 
recession, which started in December of 1994 and continued into the first half of 1995. The fall in 
the peso helped boost exports for a while, but the peso appreciated as capital flowed back into the 
country and the advantage of a competitive exchange rate was soon lost. 
 
FIGURE 11 
Mexico and the US: Annual GDP Growth 
 
Source: IMF (2013a). 
 
Perhaps more importantly over the longer run, the U.S. economy was just beginning a period in 
which its growth would be driven by enormous asset bubbles. First there was the stock market 
bubble, which burst in 2000-2002, causing a recession in both the Unites States and Mexico.  The 
stock market bubble was then immediately replaced by what would then become the biggest asset 
bubble in world history, the United States’ real estate bubble. This bubble burst in 2006-2007, 
causing the Great Recession.  Mexico’s loss of output from the U.S. Great Recession was the worst 
in Latin America, with a decline in real GDP of 6.7 percent from the second quarter of 2008 to the 
second quarter of 2009.22 
 
In May of 2013, after the U.S. Federal Reserve announced a future “tapering” of its quantitative 
easing program (QE3), there were fears of a repeat of the 1994 peso crisis. Gross foreign portfolio 
                                                 
22   INEGI (2014b). 
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inflows came to a sudden stop23, and the Mexican economy took a hit, with projected growth at 1.22 
percent for the year.24 As the IMF noted in its recent Article IV consultation for Mexico:  
 
Based on a recent survey, the BIS reported that the Mexican peso is the most actively 
traded emerging market currency in the world, with a daily global trading volume of 
US$135 billion. This means that Mexico’s deep and liquid foreign exchange and domestic 
equity and sovereign bond markets can serve as an early port of call for global investors in 
episodes of financial turbulence and hence are susceptible to risks of contagion.25 
 
This is not a good situation for any developing country to be in: hedge funds and international 
portfolio managers seeking to reduce their overall exposure to emerging market assets, or hedge 
against currency depreciation in emerging markets because of trouble that may emerge from 
anywhere in the world, look first to sell off Mexican assets or bet against the peso.  As the IMF also 
notes, “the Mexican peso is fully convertible and trades 24 hours daily.” While the policy decisions 
that led to this situation were not all written into NAFTA, many were closely related in that they 
were part of a strategy of guaranteeing foreign investors the kinds of capital mobility that they 
wanted, in order to attract foreign investment (both portfolio investment and FDI).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As was well known at the time of NAFTA’s passage, the main purpose of NAFTA was to lock in a 
set of economic policies, some of which were already well under way in the decade prior, including 
the liberalization of manufacturing, foreign investment and ownership, and other changes.26  The 
idea was that the continuation and expansion of these policies would allow Mexico to achieve 
efficiencies and economic progress that was not possible under the developmentalist, protectionist 
economic model that had prevailed in the decades before 1980. While some of the policy changes 
were undoubtedly necessary and/or positive, the end result has been decades of economic failure by 
almost any economic or social indicator. This is true whether we compare Mexico to its 
developmentalist past, or even if the comparison is to the rest of Latin America since NAFTA. After 
20 years, these results should provoke more public discussion as to what went wrong.  
  
                                                 
23  IMF (2013b). Figure 5. 
24  IMF (2013a). 
25  IMF (2013). 
26  See Tornell and Esquivel (1995). 
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